An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United States Corporate Codes of Ethics

WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES, Forthcoming

25 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2011

See all articles by Richard Moberly

Richard Moberly

University of Nebraska College of Law

Lindsey E. Wylie

University of Nebraska at Lincoln

Date Written: August 26, 2011

Abstract

Companies have issued Codes of Ethics (also called Codes of Conduct) for decades, and these Codes increasingly have contained provisions related to whistleblowing. For example, Codes often encourage or even require corporate employees to report incidents of misconduct they witness. Code provisions describe the types of misconduct employees should report and provide numerous ways for employees to make reports. Moreover, companies use Codes to promise employees that they will not retaliate against whistleblowers. Indeed, because these whistleblowing provisions have become an important part of a corporation’s internal control and risk management systems, they merit closer examination to determine exactly what they require and promise. Accordingly, this chapter describes the results of the first comprehensive empirical study of whistleblower provisions contained in United States corporate Codes of Ethics.

Keywords: whistleblowing, whistleblower, code of ethics, code of conduct, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Moberly, Richard and Wylie, Lindsey E., An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United States Corporate Codes of Ethics (August 26, 2011). WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961651

Richard Moberly (Contact Author)

University of Nebraska College of Law ( email )

103 McCollum Hall
P.O. Box 830902
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
United States
402-472-1256 (Phone)

Lindsey E. Wylie

University of Nebraska at Lincoln ( email )

730 N. 14th Street
Lincoln, NE 68588
United States

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