Abstract

 
 

References (60)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence


Rui A. Albuquerque


Boston University - School of Management; Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Art Durnev


University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business

Yrjo Koskinen


Boston University - School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

February 27, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms can choose to engage
in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We model CSR activities as an investment in
customer loyalty and derive predictions for how CSR affects systematic risk and firm
value. The paper tests the predictions empirically and finds evidence consistent with
the following: CSR firms exhibit lower systematic risk and this effect is stronger in
di§erentiated goods industries, in consumer goods industries and in industries where
the market capitalization of CSR firms is lowest; CSR firms have higher firm value; and,
the ratio of CSR profits to non-CSR profits is countercyclical. In the empirical tests,
we address a potential endogeneity problem by instrumenting CSR using data on the
political affiliation of the firm’s home state, and data on environmental and engineering
disasters and product recalls.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, customer loyalty, systematic risk, expected return, industry equilibrium

JEL Classification: G12, G32, D43, L13, M14

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 20, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Albuquerque, Rui A., Durnev, Art and Koskinen, Yrjo, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence (February 27, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961971 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961971

Contact Information

Rui A. Albuquerque
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.bu.edu/ralbuque/
Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics ( email )
Caminho da Palma de Cima
Lisbon, 1649-023
Portugal
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Artyom Durnev (Contact Author)
University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )
108 Pappajohn Business Building
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States
(514) 398-5394 (Phone)
(514) 398-3876 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.artdurnev.com
Yrjo Koskinen
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-9775 (Phone)
617-353-6667 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://smgnet.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/KoskinenYrjo.html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 606
Downloads: 187

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.203 seconds