Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962065
 


 



Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause


Amanda M. Rose


Vanderbilt University - Law School

November 19, 2011

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra, Vol. 160, p. 87, 2011

Abstract:     
This is a response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). Bratton and Wachter argue that fraud-on-the-market class actions (FOTM) should be eliminated and replaced with stepped-up public enforcement efforts targeted at individual wrongdoers (rather than the corporate enterprise, the FOTM target of choice). In this Response, I do not disagree: My own scholarship has similarly emphasized the benefits of shifting away from FOTM to greater reliance on public enforcement mechanisms. Instead, I take the opportunity to elaborate on the deterrence and corporate governance shortcomings of FOTM, strengthening further the case Bratton and Wachter make for an enhanced public enforcement role.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Securities fraud, enterprise liability, fraud on the market, deterrence, corporate governance, private enforcement, public enforcement, Securities & Exchange Commission

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Date posted: November 22, 2011 ; Last revised: September 14, 2012

Suggested Citation

Rose, Amanda M., Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause (November 19, 2011). University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra, Vol. 160, p. 87, 2011 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962065

Contact Information

Amanda M. Rose (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
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