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Heterogeneous Firms, Trade, and Economic Policy: Insights from a Simple Two-Sector Model


Michael Pflüger


University of Passau; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Stephan Russek


affiliation not provided to SSRN


IZA Discussion Paper No. 6109

Abstract:     
The robust empirical finding that exporting firms are systematically different from firms that merely serve domestic consumers has inspired the development of a new brand of trade theory, the theory of heterogeneous firms and trade. The establishment of a canonical model due to Melitz (2003) has induced a recent wave of research which explores various policy issues and policy instruments. This paper uses a simple tractable two-sector model of monopolistic competition as unifying framework to bring out key lessons of this recent research. We address the gains from trade, country asymmetries involving technology potentials, market sizes, trade openness and various business conditions as well as the international repercussions that emerge when countries non-cooperatively choose entry subsidies and their levels of basic research. We also reinvestigate the process of market exit.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: firm heterogeneity, monopolistic competition, economic policies and welfare

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F15, L25

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Date posted: November 20, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Pflüger, Michael and Russek, Stephan, Heterogeneous Firms, Trade, and Economic Policy: Insights from a Simple Two-Sector Model. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6109. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962187

Contact Information

Michael Pflüger (Contact Author)
University of Passau ( email )
Innstrasse 27
Passau, 94032
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Mohrenstrasse 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
Stephan Russek
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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