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The Distributional Impact of Public Goods Provision: A Veil of Ignorance Approach


Claudio Thum


University of Munich, CES; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Alfons J. Weichenrieder


University of Frankfurt - Chair of Public Finance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration

November 22, 1999


Abstract:     
This paper considers the redistribution implied by different tax-benefit systems by using the 'veil of ignorance' approach. Redistribution from rich to poor is interpreted as an insurance from a (hypothetical) ex ante situation in which individuals lack any knowledge about their future income situation. Taking redistribution and insurance as synonymous, the paper derives cases of redistributionally neutral systems of taxation and public good provision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

JEL Classification: H23, D30, H41

working papers series


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Date posted: December 2, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Thum, Claudio and Weichenrieder, Alfons J., The Distributional Impact of Public Goods Provision: A Veil of Ignorance Approach (November 22, 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=196248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.196248

Contact Information

Claudio Thum (Contact Author)
University of Munich, CES ( email )
Schackstr. 4
Department of Economics
80539 Munich
Germany
49 89 2180 3104 (Phone)
49 89 39 73 03 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Alfons J. Weichenrieder
University of Frankfurt - Chair of Public Finance ( email )
Mertonstr. 17
P.O. Box 11932
60054 Frankfurt (Main)
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb02/weichenrieder/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Augasse 2-6
Vienna, Wien A-1090
Austria
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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