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Can Governments Do it Better? Merger Mania and Hospital Outcomes in the English NHS


Martin S. Gaynor


Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

Mauro Laudicella


Imperial College Business School & Centre for Health Policy

Carol Propper


University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO); University of Bristol - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

November 2011

NBER Working Paper No. w17608

Abstract:     
The literature on mergers between private hospitals suggests that such mergers often produce little benefit. Despite this, the UK government has pursued an active policy of hospital merger. These mergers are initiated by a regulator, acting on behalf of the public, and justified on the grounds that merger will improve outcomes. We examine whether this promise is met. We exploit the fact that between 1997 and 2006 in England around half the short term general hospitals were involved in a merger, but that politics means that selection for a merger may be random with respect to future performance. We examine the impact of mergers on a large set of outcomes including financial performance, productivity, waiting times and clinical quality and find little evidence that mergers achieved gains other than a reduction in activity. In addition, mergers reduce the scope for competition between hospitals.

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Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

working papers series


Date posted: November 21, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Gaynor, Martin S., Laudicella, Mauro and Propper, Carol, Can Governments Do it Better? Merger Mania and Hospital Outcomes in the English NHS (November 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17608. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962500

Contact Information

Martin S. Gaynor (Contact Author)
Carnegie Mellon University ( email )
H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy
and Management
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7933 (Phone)
412-268-5338 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation
12 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
Mauro Laudicella
Imperial College Business School & Centre for Health Policy ( email )
Tanaka Building
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7594 9765 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7594 9189 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/people/m.laudicella
Carol Propper
University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) ( email )
12 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Economics/department/profiles/propper.htm
University of Bristol - Department of Economics ( email )
8 Woodland Road
Bristol BS8 ITN
United Kingdom
+44 117 928 8427 (Phone)
+44 117 954 6997 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Economics/department/profiles/propper.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  28
Citations:  1

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