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Coordination Under Threshold Uncertainty in a Public Goods GameAstrid DannenbergGöteborg University Andreas LöschelCentre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Gabriele PaolacciErasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management Christiane ReifCentre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management Research Alessandro TavoniLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology November 22, 2011 Ca’ Foscari University of Venice Economics Working Paper No. 20 Abstract: We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48 Keywords: public good, threshold uncertainty, ambiguity, experiment JEL Classification: C72, C92, H41, Q54 working papers seriesDate posted: November 24, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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