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Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride


Pradeep K. Dubey


SUNY Stony Brook - Center for Game Theory in Economics

John Geanakoplos


Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Ori Haimanko


Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation
November 22, 2011

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1835

Abstract:     
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus

JEL Classification: C72, D01, D23, L14

working papers series


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Date posted: November 23, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Dubey, Pradeep K., Geanakoplos, John and Haimanko, Ori , Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride (November 22, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1835. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963340

Contact Information

Pradeep K. Dubey
SUNY Stony Brook - Center for Game Theory in Economics ( email )
Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States
631-632-7555 (Phone)
631-632-7516 (Fax)
John Geanakoplos (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3397 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_gean.htm
Ori Haimanko
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )
Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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