Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963427
 
 

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Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

David Teece


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Leonard Waverman


London Business School

November 22, 2011

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-50

Abstract:     
Dynamic competitive forces are dramatically altering mobile markets in the U.S. and around the world. Wireless networks, having sunk considerable capital in the creation of phone systems, must not only compete among themselves for subscribers, but also need to form strategic alliances with emerging handset application platforms (HAPs) created by such firms as Research in Motion (Blackberry), Apple (iPhone), and Google (Android). Current developments illustrate two fundamental aspects of innovation. First, that innovations created by one set of investors may generate returns for complementary suppliers, either via coordinated activity (strategic platforms) or competitive rivalry (appropriation). Second, that the efficiency of such ecosystems may be enhanced by market structure innovations that either extend vertical control or delimit it. This runs counter to the prevailing popular and regulatory sentiment that “open” platforms offer categorically superior welfare outcomes than do “closed” systems – aka “walled gardens.”

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

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Date posted: November 25, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Teece, David and Waverman, Leonard, Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems (November 22, 2011). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-50. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963427 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963427

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

David J. Teece
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
(510) 647-1075 (Phone)
Leonard Waverman
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
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