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Endogenous Institutions: Law as a Coordinating DeviceGillian HadfieldUSC Law School and Department of Economics Barry R. WeingastStanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace November 1, 2011 USC CLEO Research Paper No. C11-20 USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-28 Abstract: Scholars widely agree that long-term economic growth requires a legal system providing for rule of law, contract enforcement and impersonal exchange. In this paper, we address a piece of this broad issue by studying the question, what is law? Drawing on other work (Hadfield & Weingast 2011), we argue that law has developed its distinctive structure, at least in part, to coordinate beliefs among diverse individuals and thus improve the efficacy of decentralized rule enforcement systems. In this paper we apply the framework of this coordination account of law to the emergence of medieval contract law and to constitutional law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51 Keywords: legal theory, institutions, law and development, constitutional law, law merchant, coordination games Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: November 24, 2011 ; Last revised: December 8, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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