Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963498
 


 



The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws


Paul D. Weitzel


Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP

November 22, 2011

2013 BYU L. Rev. 65 (2013)

Abstract:     
Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to compensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this article takes a more moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and bylaw provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an acquisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits, while allowing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four standard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitration. Because enforcement would be customized on a company-by-company basis, shareholders could set a better balance between costs and benefits than the ham-fisted, one-size-fits-all regime functioning today. This proposal requires no legislative action; it requires only that the SEC bring its statutory interpretation in line with current Supreme Court precedent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Arbitration, shareholder litigation, derivative suit, bylaws, charter, AT&T Mobility, class action, Delaware law, corporate governance

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Date posted: November 23, 2011 ; Last revised: September 17, 2014

Suggested Citation

Weitzel, Paul D., The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws (November 22, 2011). 2013 BYU L. Rev. 65 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963498 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963498

Contact Information

Paul D. Weitzel (Contact Author)
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP ( email )
450 Lexington Ave.
New York, NY 10017
United States
650-752-2067 (Phone)
650-752-3667 (Fax)
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