On the Importance of Internal Control Systems in the Capital Allocation Decision: Evidence from SOX
David De Angelis
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business
April 21, 2014
I examine the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to the performance reported by their business segments. The effects are most pronounced in conglomerates that are prone to information problems and agency conflicts within the organization. In addition, conglomerates’ productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions across corporate hierarchies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Internal Capital Allocation, Internal Capital Markets, Internal Control Systems, Asymmetric Information, Agency Conflicts, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
JEL Classification: D22, D82, G30, G31, G34, G38working papers series
Date posted: November 25, 2011 ; Last revised: April 22, 2014
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