Abstract

 
 

References (50)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Does Family Control Matter? International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis


Karl V. Lins


University of Utah - Department of Finance

Paolo F. Volpin


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Hannes F. Wagner


Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

May 1, 2013

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We study whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries. We find that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance. Further, we find that within family groups liquidity shocks are passed on through investment cuts across the group. Our evidence is consistent with families taking actions to increase the likelihood that the firms under their control, and their control benefits, survive the crisis, at the expense of outside shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: blockholders, control, financial crisis, family

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G32

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 25, 2011 ; Last revised: May 2, 2013

Suggested Citation

Lins, Karl V., Volpin, Paolo F. and Wagner, Hannes F., Does Family Control Matter? International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis (May 1, 2013). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964764 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1964764

Contact Information

Karl V. Lins (Contact Author)
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)
Paolo F. Volpin
London Business School ( email )
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 70008217 (Phone)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Hannes F. Wagner
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/hanneswagner
Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,140
Downloads: 290
Download Rank: 50,155
References:  50
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.594 seconds