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School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds


Lars Ehlers


University of Montreal - Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ

Isa Emin Hafalir


Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

M. Bumin Yenmez


Carnegie Mellon University - Tepper School of Business

Muhammed Ali Yildirim


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

November 1, 2012


Abstract:     
Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of di fferent student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and non-wastefulness properties; and only constrained non-wasteful assignments which are fair for same type students can be guaranteed to exist. We introduce the student exchange algorithm with hard bounds (SEAHB) that finds a Pareto optimal assignment among such assignments. To achieve fair (across all types) and non-wasteful assignments, we propose the control constraints to be interpreted as soft bounds- flexible limits that regulate school priorities dynamically. In this setting, the deferred acceptance algorithm with soft bounds (DAASB) finds an assignment that is Pareto optimal among fair assignments while eliciting true preferences. Thus, we demonstrate DAASB has clear benefi ts over SEAHB.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: School Choice, Affirmative Action

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D78, I20

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Date posted: November 27, 2011 ; Last revised: February 22, 2013

Suggested Citation

Ehlers, Lars, Hafalir, Isa Emin, Yenmez, M. Bumin and Yildirim, Muhammed Ali, School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds (November 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1965074

Contact Information

Lars Ehlers
University of Montreal - Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ ( email )
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
Isa Emin Hafalir
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
M. Bumin Yenmez (Contact Author)
Carnegie Mellon University - Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Muhammed Ali Yildirim
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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