Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=196529
 
 

References (20)



 
 

Citations (44)



 
 

Footnotes (31)



 


 



Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement


A. Mitchell Polinsky


Stanford Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Steven Shavell


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 2000

Journal of Public Economics

Abstract:     
We analyze corruption in law enforcement: the payment of bribes to enforcement agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them, and the actual framing of innocent individuals. Bribery, extortion, and framing reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly, extortion should not be sanctioned. The state may also combat corruption by paying rewards to enforcement agents for reporting violations. Such rewards can partially or completely mitigate the problem of bribery, but they encourage framing. The optimal reward may be relatively low to discourage extortion and framing, or relatively high to discourage bribery.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: August 28, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement (April 2000). Journal of Public Economics. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=196529 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.196529

Contact Information

A. Mitchell Polinsky (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0886 (Phone)
650-723-3557 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3668 (Phone)
617-496-2256 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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