Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets
University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
University of Bonn
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8670
We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profi t stream in a continuous-time infi nite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strength. If the externality that one side exerts is suffi ciently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prices when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admit closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: Bayesian Learning, Monopoly Experimentation, Network Effects, Optimal Control, Two-Sided Market
JEL Classification: D42, D83, L12
Date posted: November 29, 2011
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