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Symbols, Group Identity and the Hold-Up Problem


Hodaka Morita


University of New South Wales - School of Economics

Maroš Servátka


University of Canterbury - New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory

November 30, 2011


Abstract:     
Groups, companies, and organizations identify themselves via symbols. Symbols have the potential to create group identity and at the same time create group boundaries, thus allowing for achieving the benefits of cooperation by ingroup members. We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of group identity, created by the use of symbols, in mitigating the hold-up problem. As a team symbol we employ color t-shirts. We find that the usage of t-shirts itself does not create a strong enough group identity to mitigate the hold-up problem. However, in our previous research, we found that group identity created by t-shirts and a group chat aimed to help team members to solve a task is capable of resolving the hold-up problem. These findings are consistent with the everyday practice where organizations often make significant investments in team-building and socialization activities, suggesting that an important objective of such activities might be to strengthen group identity so that it is effective even in highly strategic environments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: altruism, experiment, group identity, hold-up problem, other-regarding preferences, relation-specific investment, symbols, team membership

JEL Classification: C91, D20, L20

working papers series


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Date posted: November 30, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Morita, Hodaka and Servátka, Maroš, Symbols, Group Identity and the Hold-Up Problem (November 30, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1966354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1966354

Contact Information

Hodaka Morita
University of New South Wales - School of Economics ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
(+61) 9385 3341 (Phone)
(+61) 9313 6337 (Fax)
Maros Servatka (Contact Author)
University of Canterbury - New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch
New Zealand
+64 3 364 2825 (Phone)
+64-3-3642635 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/people/servatka.shtml
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