Incentives' Effect in Influenza Vaccination
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Industrial Engineering and Management; Ono Academic College
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
December 1, 2011
Management Science (Informs), Forthcoming
In the majority of developed countries, the level of influenza vaccination coverage in all age groups is sub-optimal. Hence, the authorities offer different kinds of incentives for people to become inoculated such as subsidizing immunization or placing immunization centers in malls to make the process more accessible. We built a theoretical epidemiological game model to find the optimal incentive for inoculation and the corresponding expected level of vaccination coverage. The model was supported by survey data from questionnaires about people's perceptions about influenza and the vaccination against it. Results suggest that the optimal magnitude of the incentives should be greater when less contagious seasonal strains of influenza are involved, greater for the non-elderly population rather than the elderly, and should rise as high as $60 per inoculated individual so that all children between the ages of six months and four years will be inoculated.
Keywords: influenza, vaccination, game theory, incentive, SIRAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 2, 2011 ; Last revised: October 1, 2013
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