Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967102
 
 

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Search Advertising


Alexandre De Corniere


University of Oxford

June 18, 2013


Abstract:     
Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially after having entered a query, I show that targeting reduces search costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, a profit-maximizing search engine imposes a distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, which may negate the benefits of targeting. The search engine also has incentives to provide a suboptimal quality of sponsored links.
Competition among search engines can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the downstream market structure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: search engine, targeted advertising, consumer search

JEL Classification: D43, D83, L13, M37

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Date posted: December 2, 2011 ; Last revised: August 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

de Corniere, Alexandre, Search Advertising (June 18, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1967102

Contact Information

Alexandre De Corniere (Contact Author)
University of Oxford ( email )
Department of Economics
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3UQ
United Kingdom
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