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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967246
 
 

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Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation - Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries under the New Deal


Ryan Lampe


California State University, East Bay - Department of Economics

Petra Moser


Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

May 26, 2014

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 417

Abstract:     
Patent pools have become a prominent mechanism to reduce litigation risks and facilitate the commercialization of new technologies. This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools that would form in the absence of effective antitrust. Difference-in-differences regressions of patents and patent citations across 20 industries imply a 14 percent decline in patenting for each additional patent that is included in a pool. An analysis of the mechanism by which pools discourage innovation indicates that this decline is driven by technologies for which the creation of a pool weakened competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 67

Keywords: Patent Pools, Innovation, Patents, Intellectual Property, Economic History

JEL Classification: K00, N00, N42, O31

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Date posted: December 2, 2011 ; Last revised: May 28, 2014

Suggested Citation

Lampe, Ryan and Moser, Petra, Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation - Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries under the New Deal (May 26, 2014). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 417. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967246

Contact Information

Ryan Lampe (Contact Author)
California State University, East Bay - Department of Economics ( email )
25800 Carlos Bee Blvd.
Hayward, CA 94542
United States
Petra Moser
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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