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Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems


Francoise Forges


Université Paris-Dauphine - CEREMADE; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Roberto Serrano


Brown University
August 6, 2011


Abstract:     
This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Strategic Externalities, Informational Externalities, Exchange Economies, Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions, Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D51, D82

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Date posted: December 6, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Forges, Francoise and Serrano, Roberto, Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (August 6, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969054

Contact Information

Francoise Forges (Contact Author)
Université Paris-Dauphine - CEREMADE ( email )
Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Roberto Serrano
Brown University ( email )
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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