Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969065
 


 



Who Let You into the House?


Lawrence A. Hamermesh


Widener University School of Law

December 6, 2011

Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2012, no. 2, p. 359
Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-49

Abstract:     
Recent Congressional corporate governance initiatives have reallocated to independent directors the functions of hiring and supervising the work of certain “gatekeepers,” and some have proposed such a reallocation with respect to general counsel, as a means to address cognitive biases and capture by senior management that may prevent inside counsel from identifying and preventing corporate misconduct. That proposal, however, does not sufficiently account for the positive effect on corporate conduct arising from a close relationship of trust and confidence between general counsel and the CEO or other senior managers. Eliminating such a relationship is likely to undermine access to internal information and the willingness of corporate actors to respond positively to counsel’s efforts to promote legal compliance. In contrast, steps short of reallocating oversight of the general counsel to independent directors are likely to promote independent judgment on the part of general counsel without unduly undermining those benefits.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: general counsel, gatekeeper, corporate governance, attorney-client, in-house counsel

JEL Classification: K20, M13, M14

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: December 6, 2011 ; Last revised: May 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Hamermesh, Lawrence A., Who Let You into the House? (December 6, 2011). Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2012, no. 2, p. 359; Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-49. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969065

Contact Information

Lawrence A. Hamermesh (Contact Author)
Widener University School of Law ( email )
PO Box 7474
Wilmington, DE 19803
United States
302-477-2132 (Phone)
302-477-2257 (Fax)
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