References (21)



Soft Shareholder Activism

Doron Levit

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

October 17, 2014

This paper studies informal communications and exit as alternative ways through which investors can influence managers when obtaining control is not feasible or too costly. The first result shows that exit relaxes the tension between investors and managers, and thereby enhances the effectiveness of communications as a form of shareholder activism. The second result shows that public communications are more effective than private communications if and only if managers are concerned about the stock price and their decisions are observed by the market. Overall, the analysis relates the effectiveness of communications to market liquidity; entrenchment and compensation structure of managers; and investors' expertise, investment horizon and ownership size.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Voice, Exit, Corporate Governance, Communication, Cheap-Talk

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D83, G34

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Date posted: December 8, 2011 ; Last revised: October 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron, Soft Shareholder Activism (October 17, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969475

Contact Information

Doron Levit (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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References:  21

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