Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970001
 


 



Secret Inventions


Jonas Anderson


American University - Washington College of Law

December 8, 2011

Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 26, p. 917, 2011
American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2011-33

Abstract:     
Patent law - and innovation policy more generally - has traditionally been conceptualized as antithetical to secrecy. Not only does the patent system require inventors to publicly disclose their inventions in order to receive a patent, but various patent doctrines are designed to encourage inventors to forego trade secrecy. This Article offers a critique of the law’s preference for patents. In particular, this Article examines whether and under what circumstances the law should prefer patents over secrets, and vice versa.

As an initial step towards a theoretically-supported system of inventor incentives, this Article constructs a framework that attempts to balance the public trade-offs of patenting and secrecy. Theoretically, the framework is based upon the insight that the fundamental economic rationale for the existence of the patent system - overcoming the market failure of informational public goods - is inapplicable when secrecy is viable. The framework highlights scenarios in which innovation can be advanced by encouraging secrecy, rather than patenting. The Article concludes by suggesting changes to current law that would encourage inventor use of secrecy, when appropriate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Patents, Trade Secrets, Innovation, Inventors

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Date posted: December 9, 2011 ; Last revised: May 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Jonas, Secret Inventions (December 8, 2011). Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 26, p. 917, 2011; American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2011-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970001

Contact Information

Jonas Anderson (Contact Author)
American University - Washington College of Law ( email )
4801 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
United States
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