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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970771
 
 

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Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining


Christian M. Dahl


Department of Business and Economics

Daniel Le Maire


University of Copenhagen

Jakob Roland Munch


University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)


IZA Discussion Paper No. 6176

Abstract:     
This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm-level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining, and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: wage bargaining, decentralization, wage dispersion

JEL Classification: J31, J51, C23

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Date posted: December 11, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Dahl, Christian M. and le Maire, Daniel and Munch, Jakob Roland, Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6176. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970771

Contact Information

Christian M. Dahl (Contact Author)
Department of Business and Economics ( email )
Campusvej 55
DK-5230 Odense M
Denmark
29125486 (Phone)
Daniel Le Maire
University of Copenhagen ( email )
Jakob Roland Munch
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )
Copenhagen University Library
Licenssekretariatet Nørre Alle 49
DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Denmark
+45 35323019 (Phone)
+45 35323000 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/Faculty_And_Staff/showID.asp?profile_id=1260
Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)
Porcelaenshaven, Bldg 65
DK-2000 Frederiksberg
Denmark
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