Abstract

 


 



How Doctors' Disclosures Increase Patient Anxiety


Sunita Sah


Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy; Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

George Loewenstein


Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences

Daylian M. Cain


Yale School of Management

December 11, 2011


Abstract:     
Disclosure is often advocated as a potential solution to conflicts of interest. Yet, in two experiments we show that disclosure of a doctor’s financial, or non-financial, conflict of interest has an adverse effect on the doctor-patient relationship. Disclosure puts the patient in an effective bind: it decreases trust in a doctor’s advice while simultaneously increasing discomfort to turn down the doctor’s advice due to the patients’ desire to avoid signaling distrust to their doctor. We show that the discomfort remains even when disclosure is required by law and the patient feels similar discomfort if the conflict disclosed is small or large. We also demonstrate that the discomfort is reduced if the disclosure if provided by an external source rather than directly from the advisor.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: conflicts of interest, disclosure, transparency, medical, advice, ethics, regulation

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Date posted: December 13, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Sah, Sunita, Loewenstein, George F. and Cain, Daylian M., How Doctors' Disclosures Increase Patient Anxiety (December 11, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1970961

Contact Information

Sunita Sah (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.sunitasah.com/research
Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )
124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

George F. Loewenstein
Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences ( email )
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-8787 (Phone)
412-268-6938 (Fax)
Daylian M. Cain
Yale School of Management ( email )
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
203 432 9441 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mba.yale.edu/faculty/profiles/cain.shtml
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