The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
December 12, 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-57
This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: third-party financed litigation, barretry, torts, litigation and procedure, champerty, private incentive to litigation, social incentive to litigate, economics of litigation, maintenance, subrogation, patent trolls
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K19, K39, K40, K41, K49working papers series
Date posted: December 13, 2011
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