The Use of Tax Havens in Exemption Regimes

54 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2011 Last revised: 19 Mar 2023

See all articles by Anna Gumpert

Anna Gumpert

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

James R. Hines Jr.

University of Michigan; NBER

Monika Schnitzer

University of Munich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2011

Abstract

This paper analyzes the tax haven investment behavior of multinational firms from a country that exempts foreign income from taxation. High foreign tax rates generally encourage firms to invest in tax havens, though significant costs of reallocating taxable income dampen these incentives. The behavior of German manufacturing firms from 2002-2008 is consistent with this prediction: at the mean, one percentage point higher foreign tax rates are associated with three percentage point greater likelihoods of owning tax haven affiliates. This contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms subject to home country taxation, which are more likely to invest in tax havens if they face lower foreign tax rates. Foreign tax rates appear to be unrelated to tax haven investments of German firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty they face in reallocating taxable income.

Suggested Citation

Gumpert, Anna and Hines, James Rodger and Schnitzer, Monika, The Use of Tax Havens in Exemption Regimes (December 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17644, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971468

Anna Gumpert (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
Tuebingen, Baden-Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

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Germany

James Rodger Hines

University of Michigan ( email )

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NBER

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Monika Schnitzer

University of Munich - Department of Economics ( email )

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Germany
+49 89 2180 2217 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 2767 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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