Shaping Liquidity: On the Causal Effects of Voluntary Disclosure
London Business School
Mary Brooke Billings
New York University
Bryan T. Kelly
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
August 25, 2013
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31352
Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms’ shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate and that such efforts improve liquidity. Firms respond to an exogenous loss of public information by providing more timely and informative earnings guidance. Responses appear motivated by a desire to reduce information asymmetries between retail and institutional investors. Liquidity improves as a result and in turn increases firm value. This suggests that managers can causally influence their cost of capital via voluntary disclosure.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Date posted: April 3, 2012 ; Last revised: August 25, 2013
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