Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games With Identical Anonymous Best-Replies
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)
University of La Laguna
December 14, 2011
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-138
This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: trimatrix games, Nash equilibrium, best-reply correspondences
JEL Classification: C72working papers series
Date posted: December 15, 2011
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