Abstract

  


 



Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games With Identical Anonymous Best-Replies


Peter Borm


Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Ruud Hendrickx


Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Carlos Gonzalez-Alcon


University of La Laguna
December 14, 2011

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-138

Abstract:     
This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: trimatrix games, Nash equilibrium, best-reply correspondences

JEL Classification: C72

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Date posted: December 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Borm, Peter E. M., Hendrickx, Ruud and Gonzalez-Alcon, Carlos, Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games With Identical Anonymous Best-Replies (December 14, 2011). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-138. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1972140

Contact Information

Peter E. M. Borm
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Ruud Hendrickx
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Carlos Gonzalez-Alcon (Contact Author)
University of La Laguna ( email )
38071 La Laguna, Tenerife
Spain
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