A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks
Stephen R. Munzer
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
September 14, 2011
Econ Journal Watch, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 265-73, September 2011
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 11-36
For nearly a century, most persons who have studied or written about property have conceived of it as a bundle of rights or, colloquially, as a bundle of sticks. In the mid 1990s, several philosophically minded academic lawyers questioned whether property should be thought of as a bundle at all. The impact of their work is reflected in Merrill and Smith (2007), a highly regarded and intellectually challenging casebook used in many U.S. law schools. Merrill and Smith emphasize that property is centrally a right to exclude and is generally held in rem, that is, is good against all the world. They find bundle theories of property defective for various reasons. This essay argues to the contrary. There are solid grounds for holding on to at least some bundle theories, which facilitate the careful analysis of the complexity of property. Moreover, Merrill and Smith’s criticisms are often misguided or ineffective. Lastly, their account gives an overly simple picture of property and views property law as a more unified subject than it actually is.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
Keywords: property, bundle of rights, exclusion, rights, legal realism, Hohfeld, Honore, philosophy of law
JEL Classification: A1, K00, K1Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 15, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.485 seconds