Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972754
 
 

References (12)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets


Massimo Motta


Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Michele Ruta


World Trade Organization (WTO)

January 2012

Economica, Vol. 79, Issue 313, pp. 115-136, 2012

Abstract:     
This paper looks at the political economy of merger policy under autarky and in international markets. We assume that merger policy is decided by antitrust authorities — whose objective is to maximize welfare — but can be influenced by governments, which are subject to lobbying by firms (insiders or outsiders to the merger). We argue that political economy distortions may explain some of the recently observed merger policy conflicts between authorities and politicians, as well as between institutions belonging to different countries. We illustrate our analysis with applications motivated by recent merger cases that have been widely debated in the international press.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: December 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Motta, Massimo and Ruta, Michele, A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets (January 2012). Economica, Vol. 79, Issue 313, pp. 115-136, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2010.00874.x

Contact Information

Massimo Motta (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Michele Ruta
World Trade Organization (WTO) ( email )
Rue de Lausanne 154
Geneva 21, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 7396354 (Phone)
+41 22 7395762 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  12
Citations:  2

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