Abstract

 


 



A ‘De Soto Effect’ in Industry? Evidence from the Russian Federation


William Pyle


Middlebury College - Department of Economics

Koen J. L. Schoors


Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE); Ghent University - Department of General Economics

December 15, 2011

BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 33/2011

Abstract:     
Russia’s tremendous inter-regional variation in the pace of industrial land rights reform has meant that geography has helped determine the current tenure status of firms’ production plots as much as any individual firm characteristics. By exploiting both this difference in the pace with which land reform has been carried out across Russia’s federal subjects and a unique micro-level dataset, we present evidence strongly consistent with the proposition that more secure rights to land facilitate access to external financing. This finding is confirmed by other evidence from the survey that points to private land serving as an important source of collateral for Russian lenders and borrowers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: industrial land, property rights, Russia, collateral

JEL Classification: 016, P25, P31, R14, R52

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Date posted: December 16, 2011 ; Last revised: November 3, 2012

Suggested Citation

Pyle, William and Schoors, Koen J. L., A ‘De Soto Effect’ in Industry? Evidence from the Russian Federation (December 15, 2011). BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 33/2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1973509

Contact Information

William Pyle (Contact Author)
Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )
Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
(802) 443-3240 (Phone)
Koen J. L. Schoors
Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 265 35 99 (Fax)
Ghent University - Department of General Economics ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 264 35 99 (Fax)
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