Media Market Concentration, Advertising Levels, and Ad Prices
Simon P. Anderson
University of Virginia - Department of Economics
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics
Hans Jarle Kind
Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration (NHH); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics
University of Mannheim - Department of Economics
December 19, 2011
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3677
Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: media economics, pricing ads, advertising clutter, information congestion, mergers, entry
JEL Classification: D110, D430, L130working papers series
Date posted: December 19, 2011
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