Aggregation and Law
Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago - Law School
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School
January 1, 2011
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 122, 2012
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 375
University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 587
If a plaintiff brings two claims, each with a 0.4 probability of being valid, the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims are based on independent events, and thus the probability of at least one of the claims being valid is 0.64. If a plaintiff brings two independent claims, and each of them is too weak to justify a remedy, the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims are jointly powerful enough to justify a remedy. Thus, as a general rule courts refuse to engage in what we call factual aggregation (the first case) and normative aggregation (the second case). (We also identify other forms of aggregation.) Yet we show numerous exceptions to this rule in private and public law. Notably, in public law the hybrid rights doctrine permits courts to aggregate two weak constitutional claims as long as one involves free exercise of religion. In private law, certain tort and contract doctrines also permit aggregation. We criticize the courts’ inconsistent approaches to aggregation, and propose conditions under which courts should (and should not) aggregate.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 68Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 20, 2011 ; Last revised: October 13, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.454 seconds