Abstract

 


 



Board Interlocks and Earnings Quality


Linna Shi


State University of New York at Binghamton - School of Management

Ravi Dharwadkar


Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management

David G. Harris


Syracuse University - Joseph I. Lubin School of Accounting

March 8, 2013


Abstract:     
We build upon prior research on earnings contagion and provide evidence on how information about accounting practices, as reflected in earnings quality, transfers between interlocked firms in a broader accounting context. We first show that board interlocked firms’ earnings qualities are significantly associated and more so for audit committee interlocks, consistent with Chiu, Teoh, & Tian (2013) findings with respect to earnings restatements. We also find that these associations only arise after interlock formation and cease after interlock dissolution, indicating that endogeneity does not cause this association. In addition, we find that bad accounting, compared to good accounting, is more contagious and more strongly transferred via firms’ board interlocks. Last, we show that information transfers through board interlocks are bidirectional rather than unidirectional. Overall, in addition to providing confirming evidence for Chiu et al. (2013), we provide new, important evidence about the effects of the social context on financial accounting practices and recommend that future researchers keep social context factors in mind when investigating firms’ financial accounting practices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: Earnings quality, Board interlocks, Audit committee interlocks, Information transfer, Contagion, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M42, M49, G34, G39, D83

working papers series


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Date posted: January 7, 2012 ; Last revised: April 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Shi, Linna, Dharwadkar, Ravi and Harris, David G., Board Interlocks and Earnings Quality (March 8, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1976856 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1976856

Contact Information

Linna Shi
State University of New York at Binghamton - School of Management ( email )
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States
607-777-4640 (Phone)
Ravi Dharwadkar
Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management ( email )
900 S. Crouse Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States
David G. Harris (Contact Author)
Syracuse University - Joseph I. Lubin School of Accounting ( email )
Whitman School of Management
721 University Ave
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States
315-443-3362 (Phone)
315-443-5457 (Fax)
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