Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977513
 
 

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The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases: Theory and Practice


Marie-Laure Allain


Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences

Marcel Boyer


University of Montreal - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

Jean Pierre Ponssard


Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie

December 2011

Concurrences, No. 4, pp. 32-40, 2011

Abstract:     
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. Several recent publications have suggested that the recent fines imposed by the European Commission are too low to be dissuasive and should therefore be substantially increased. In this paper, we question the economic reasoning underlying the models used in those articles as well as the methodology used in their application. Further, we propose a more adequate dynamic framework to assess the role of fines in deterring cartels and define a dissuasive benchmark level, from which we come to the conclusion that on average recent fines are adequately dissuasive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: European Commission, Competition Policy, Cartels, Fines, Deterrence, Determination of optimal fines

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Date posted: December 28, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Allain, Marie-Laure and Boyer, Marcel and Ponssard, Jean Pierre, The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases: Theory and Practice (December 2011). Concurrences, No. 4, pp. 32-40, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977513

Contact Information

Marie-Laure Allain (Contact Author)
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences ( email )
Palaiseau, 91128
France
Marcel Boyer
University of Montreal - Department of Economics ( email )
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
514-343-7979 (Phone)
514-985-4039 (Fax)
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)
2020 rue University, 25th Floor
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2A5
Canada
514-985-4002 (Phone)
514-985-4039 (Fax)
Jean Pierre Ponssard
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )
1 rue Descartes
Paris, 75005
France
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