Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1978820
 
 

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Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing Slots


James D. Reitzes


The Brattle Group

Brendan McVeigh


Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Statistics; The Brattle Group

Nicholas Powers


The Brattle Group

Samuel Moy


The Brattle Group - Washington Offices

December 30, 2011


Abstract:     
We investigate the competitive effects of exchanges or sales of airport landing slots. In our model, airlines with potentially asymmetric slot allocations must decide upon which routes to use their landing slots. When all airlines serve the same routes in a slot-constrained Cournot Nash equilibrium, small changes in slot allocations among airlines do not affect the overall allocation of slots across routes or air fares. In a symmetric equilibrium where slot holding airlines have the same number of slots, we find that an increase in the number of slot-holding airlines leads to higher social welfare and consumer surplus, although the number of served routes may decline. Under asymmetric slot allocations, larger slot holders serve "thin" demand routes that are not served by smaller slot holders. In this situation, transfers of slots from larger to smaller slot holders increase social welfare and consumer surplus, even though fewer routes may be served. More generally, our results suggest that increases in slot concentration are harmful to consumers and social welfare, although consumers on relatively thin routes may gain air transportation service as a result.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: January 3, 2012 ; Last revised: January 14, 2012

Suggested Citation

Reitzes, James D. and McVeigh, Brendan and Powers, Nicholas and Moy, Samuel, Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing Slots (December 30, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1978820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978820

Contact Information

James D. Reitzes (Contact Author)
The Brattle Group ( email )
1850 M Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
202-955-5050 (Phone)
202-955-5059 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.brattle.com
Brendan McVeigh
Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Statistics ( email )
Baker Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States
The Brattle Group ( email )
1850 M St NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Nicholas Powers
The Brattle Group ( email )
1850 M St NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Samuel Moy
The Brattle Group - Washington Offices ( email )
1200 M Street NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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