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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1978910
 
 

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The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying


William R. Kerr


Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

William Fabius Lincoln


Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

Prachi Mishra


International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

August 12, 2013

Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 12-034

Abstract:     
How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confirmed in studying how firms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its influence on firm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: lobbying, political economy, immigration, H-1B

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, F22, F23, J61, O31, O38

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Date posted: January 3, 2012 ; Last revised: August 13, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kerr, William R. and Lincoln, William Fabius and Mishra, Prachi, The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (August 12, 2013). Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 12-034. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1978910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978910

Contact Information

William R. Kerr (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
William Fabius Lincoln
Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies ( email )
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
United States
Prachi Mishra
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
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