University of Alberta, Department of Economics
Hugo M. Mialon
Emory University - Department of Economics
July 3, 2012
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-120
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-183
This paper investigates the effects of hatred in two-player games. We model hate as “reverse-altruism” or a preference for low opponent payoffs, and derive implications for behavior in conflicts where players are motivated by hate. We use these results to illuminate several policy issues, both historical and contemporary: the strategy of non-violent resistance during the American civil rights era, shifts in U.S. national security strategy following 9/11, and the justification for criminal and civil penalty enhancements for hate crimes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Hate, conflict, (non)violence, (counter)terrorism, hate crime
JEL Classification: D74, H11, K14, K42
Date posted: January 13, 2012 ; Last revised: October 9, 2012
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