Abstract

 


 



Failure is an Option: Failure Barriers and New Firm Performance


Robert Eberhart


Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering

Charles E. Eesley


Stanford University

Kathleen M. Eisenhardt


Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering

February 7, 2012

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 111

Abstract:     
Do bankruptcy changes in the institutional environment affect the rate of founding by particular types of founders and the performance of their ventures? We take advantage of a natural experiment in Japan where during the last decade Japan implemented legal reforms to revive Japan’s economic fortunes by changes to bankruptcy laws that reduced the consequences of closing a firm. We argue that lowered costs of exit may have attracted individuals with greater human capital and social networks thus positively affecting new firm performance. We argue and test whether making it easier to fail will attract more founders and higher human capital founders resulting in improved firm performance. Our findings are: as expected the bankruptcy rate increases but at a higher rate for high human capital individuals, the rate of startup firms increases for older and elite educated entrepreneurs, and these groups of entrepreneurs are more likely to found higher performing firms. Overall, while prior research emphasizes the lowering of entry barriers, our work shows that reducing the costs of failure can also stimulate venture formation among certain groups, and lead to forming higher performing firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: entrepreneurship, institutions, Japan

JEL Classification: M13, O53, D21, D78, D92, H32

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Date posted: January 10, 2012 ; Last revised: February 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Eberhart, Robert, Eesley, Charles E. and Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., Failure is an Option: Failure Barriers and New Firm Performance (February 7, 2012). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 111. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982819 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982819

Contact Information

Robert Eberhart (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering ( email )
473 Via Ortega
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States
Charles E. Eesley
Stanford University ( email )
473 Via Ortega
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States
(740) 236-4653 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~cee
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering ( email )
473 Via Ortega
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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