Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983085
 
 

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Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees


Bryan T. Kelly


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hanno N. Lustig


UCLA - Anderson School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh


New York University Stern School of Business, Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 2012

NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31427

Abstract:     
A conspicuous amount of aggregate tail risk is missing from the price of financial sector crash insurance during the 2007-2009 crisis. The difference in costs of out-of-the-money put options for individual banks, and puts on the financial sector index, increases fourfold from its pre-crisis level. At the same time, correlations among bank stocks surge, suggesting the high put spread cannot be attributed to a relative increase in idiosyncratic risk. We show that this phenomenon is unique to the financial sector, that it cannot be explained by observed risk dynamics (volatilities and correlations), and that illiquidity and no-arbitrage violations are unlikely culprits. Instead, we provide evidence that a collective government guarantee for the financial sector lowers index put prices far more than those of individual banks, explaining the divergence in the basket-index spread. By embedding a bailout in the standard one-factor option pricing model, we can closely replicate observed put spread dynamics. During the crisis, the spread responds acutely to government intervention announcements.

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Date posted: January 13, 2012 ; Last revised: September 10, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kelly, Bryan T. and Lustig, Hanno N. and Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees (January 2012). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31427. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983085

Contact Information

Bryan T. Kelly
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-8359 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Hanno N. Lustig
UCLA - Anderson School of Management ( email )
405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh (Contact Author)
New York University Stern School of Business, Department of Finance ( email )
44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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