Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983500
 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

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Smart Buyers


Mike Burkart


Swedish House of Finance; Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); London School of Economics - Financial Markets (FMG) Group

Samuel Lee


Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

June 8, 2016

LSE FMG Discussion Paper No. 696
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 326/2012

Abstract:     
We study transactions in which sellers fears being underpaid because their outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize various observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. Key to these solutions is granting the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons problem calls for granting the buyer downside protection. But, in either case, the seller (buyer) receives a convex (concave) claim. Thus, contracts usually associated with the lemons problem, such as debt or cash-equity offers, can be equally well manifestations of the smart buyer problem, although the two information asymmetries have opposite cross-sectional implications.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Bilateral trade, asymmetric information, royalties, cash-equity offers, security design, contingent value rights, commissions, lemons problem

JEL Classification: D82, D86


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Date posted: January 12, 2012 ; Last revised: June 14, 2016

Suggested Citation

Burkart, Mike and Lee, Samuel, Smart Buyers (June 8, 2016). LSE FMG Discussion Paper No. 696; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 326/2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983500 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983500

Contact Information

Mike C. Burkart
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9678 (Phone)
+46 8 31 6422 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.hhs.se/Finance/People/ShowPerson.htm?personid=54
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/default_static.htm
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
London School of Economics - Financial Markets (FMG) Group
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/finance/facultyAndStaff/profiles/mikeBurkart.htm
Swedish House of Finance ( email )
Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)
Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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