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Purchase Price Allocations: Do They Matter?


Pierre Astolfi


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Luc J. Paugam


ESSEC Business School; University Paris-Dauphine - DRM Finance

Olivier J. Ramond


Université Paris Dauphine - CEREG research centre

January 3, 2012

CAAA Annual Conference 2012

Abstract:     
Standards setters support that purchase price allocations (PPAs) enhance financial statement decision-usefulness whereas academics and practitioners challenge this statement. We test the consequences of the quality of PPAs, subsequent to business combinations, on change in market expectations. Using the concept of abnormal goodwill – as a proxy for PPAs’ quality – we test the association between PPAs’ quality and analyst forecasts revisions, change in forecasts dispersion, and analysts’ accuracy of 200 major U.S. business combinations. We do not find evidence that PPAs’ quality have material impact on change in market expectations, suggesting that market participants fail to fully integrate information content of PPAs. Consistently, we provide evidence that PPAs’ quality enables to generate a profitable investment strategy as cumulated abnormal returns can be systematically generated based on abnormal goodwill recognized in PPAs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Purchase Price Allocation, Market Expectations, Abnormal Goodwill, Business Combination

JEL Classification: M41, G18, G14

working papers series


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Date posted: January 13, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Astolfi, Pierre, Paugam, Luc J. and Ramond, Olivier J., Purchase Price Allocations: Do They Matter? (January 3, 2012). CAAA Annual Conference 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1984001

Contact Information

Pierre Astolfi
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Luc J. Paugam (Contact Author)
ESSEC Business School ( email )
Avenue Bernard Hirsch
B.P 50105
BP 105 Cergy Cedex, 95021
France
University Paris-Dauphine - DRM Finance ( email )
Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris, 75775
France
Olivier J. Ramond
Université Paris Dauphine - CEREG research centre ( email )
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris, 75116
France
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