Property Rights, Finance and Entrepreneurship
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Stanford Graduate School of Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Christopher M. Woodruff
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)
Conference Paper, The Nobel Symposium in Economics - The Economics of Transition, Stockholm, September 1999, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 212
Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance; For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup manufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34working papers series
Date posted: December 1, 1999
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