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Property Rights, Finance and EntrepreneurshipSimon JohnsonMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) John McMillanStanford Graduate School of Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Christopher M. WoodruffUniversity of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS) November 1999 Conference Paper, The Nobel Symposium in Economics - The Economics of Transition, Stockholm, September 1999, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 212 Abstract: Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance; For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup manufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50 JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34 working papers seriesDate posted: December 1, 1999Suggested CitationContact Information
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