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Property Rights, Finance and Entrepreneurship
Simon Johnson Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) John McMillan Stanford Graduate School of Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Christopher M. Woodruff University of California, San Diego - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS) November 1999 Conference Paper, The Nobel Symposium in Economics - The Economics of Transition, Stockholm, September 1999, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 212 Abstract: Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance; For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup manufacturing firms. Access to credit does not appear to explain differences in investment. At least in the early stages of post-communist reform, retained earnings appear to have been enough to finance the investments that managers wanted to make.
JEL Classifications: G31, G32, G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: December 01, 1999 ; Last revised: January 20, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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