Citations (1)



Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch is a 'They,' Not an 'It'

Neomi Rao

George Mason University School of Law

January 13, 2012

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 194-277, November 2011
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-03

Novel legal questions raised by the war on terror and the evolving technology of warfare have highlighted the importance of executive branch legal interpretation, in particular how agencies address difficult questions about the scope and application of international law, often without review by Congress or the courts. This Article presents a public choice analysis of how the executive branch in the United States determines questions of compliance with international law. In contrast to theories that treat the state as a unitary entity, the public choice approach examines the different interests and incentives of the executive branch agencies that advise the President. These agencies frequently disagree about the content and application of international law and the executive branch often fails to coordinate these interests consistently. The unpredictability of the process encourages agencies to compete for control over international legal policy. Analyzing domestic inputs as well as coordinating institutions, the public choice approach considers how the “they” of the executive branch seeks to function as an “it.”

This leads to some distinct conclusions and predictions about international law compliance. First, it demonstrates some of the limitations of unitary state models, but also how public choice can be complementary to rational choice theories. Second, it predicts that competition to control central decision making will encourage agencies to use the indeterminacy of international law strategically. Agency officials benefit by keeping open the widest range of policy options consistent with international law. Finally, if government officials in other countries face similar incentives, this may provide an explanation based on sub-state actors for why international law does not exhibit the clarity and compliance often considered an aspiration for international law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 85

Keywords: White House, defense, department, National Security Council, OLC, office general counsel, adviser, bureaucracy, coordination, administration, customary, War Powers Resolution, treaty, realism, disaggregated, George W. Bush, Obama, Harold Koh, Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Libya

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: January 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Rao, Neomi, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch is a 'They,' Not an 'It' (January 13, 2012). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 194-277, November 2011; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984224

Contact Information

Neomi Rao (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 760
Downloads: 88
Download Rank: 211,156
Citations:  1
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Codifying Custom
By Timothy Meyer

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.187 seconds