A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation
Matthew D. Cain
University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance
Steven M. Davidoff
Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law; Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance
We provide a multi-dimensional picture of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation by examining merger litigation in a hand-collected sample of 1,117 takeovers from 2005-2011. We find that entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys drive this competition by bringing suits in jurisdictions which have previously awarded more favorable judgments and higher fees and by avoiding unfavorable jurisdictions. States with an apparent interest in attracting corporate litigation respond in-kind by adjusting judgments and awards to re-attract litigation. These states award higher attorneys’ fees and dismiss fewer cases when attorneys have been migrating to other jurisdictions. Our findings illuminate the dynamics and existence of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Merger Litigation, Takeovers, Jurisdictional Competition, Delaware, Plaintiffs' Attorneys, Shareholder Class Actionsworking papers series
Date posted: January 13, 2012 ; Last revised: January 31, 2013
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