A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation
Matthew D. Cain
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Steven Davidoff Solomon
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy
January 1, 2015
Iowa Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 165, 2015
We provide a multi-dimensional picture of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation by examining merger litigation in a hand-collected sample of 1,117 takeovers from 2005-2011. We find that entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys drive this competition by bringing suits in jurisdictions which have previously awarded more favorable judgments and higher fees and by avoiding unfavorable jurisdictions. States with an apparent interest in attracting corporate litigation respond in-kind by adjusting judgments and awards to re-attract litigation. These states award higher attorneys’ fees and dismiss fewer cases when attorneys have been migrating to other jurisdictions. Our findings illuminate the dynamics and existence of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: Merger Litigation, Takeovers, Jurisdictional Competition, Delaware, Plaintiffs' Attorneys, Shareholder Class Actions
Date posted: January 13, 2012 ; Last revised: March 30, 2015
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