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The Interactive Financial Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility and Irresponsibility


Ioannis Oikonomou


University of Reading - ICMA Centre

Chris Brooks


University of Reading - ICMA Centre

Stephen Pavelin


University of Bath - School of Management; University of Reading - Department of Economics

January 13, 2012

ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance No. DP2012-02

Abstract:     
Firms typically present a mixed picture of corporate social performance (CSP), with positive and negative indicators exhibited by the same firm. Thus, stakeholders’ judgements of corporate social responsibility (CSR) typically evaluate positives in the context of negatives, and vice versa. We present two alternative accounts of how stakeholders respond to such complexity, which provide differing implications for the financial effects of CSP: reciprocal dampening and rewarding uniformity. Our US panel study finds a U-shaped relationship – firms that exhibit solely positive or solely negative indicators outperform firms that exhibit both – which supports the notion that stakeholders’ judgements of CSR reward uniformity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Corporate social performance, Socially responsible investing

JEL Classification: C31, C33, M14

working papers series


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Date posted: January 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Oikonomou, Ioannis, Brooks, Chris and Pavelin, Stephen, The Interactive Financial Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility and Irresponsibility (January 13, 2012). ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance No. DP2012-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984917 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1984917

Contact Information

Ioannis Oikonomou
University of Reading - ICMA Centre ( email )
Whiteknights Park
P.O. Box 242
Reading RG6 6BA
United Kingdom
Chris Brooks (Contact Author)
University of Reading - ICMA Centre ( email )
Whiteknights Park
P.O. Box 242
Reading RG6 6BA
United Kingdom
+44 118 931 82 39 (Phone)
+44 118 931 47 41 (Fax)
Stephen Pavelin
University of Bath - School of Management ( email )
Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom
University of Reading - Department of Economics ( email )
Reading, RG6 6AA
United Kingdom
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