Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985539
 
 

References (43)



 


 



Shareholder and Creditor Legal Rights and the Outcome Model of Dividends


Thomas O’Connor


National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Department of Economics

Julie Byrne


Dublin City University

January 15, 2012


Abstract:     
In a sample of 22,374 firms from 35 countries, we examine the role of creditor rights, shareholder rights, and corporate governance in determining corporate dividend policy. We find that, while all three variables play a significant role in determining both the likelihood and the dividend amount, the effect of country-level creditor rights dominate. In subsequent analysis, we show that the outcome model is most effective in countries with strong creditor rights. When creditor rights are weak, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower dividends. These findings show that creditors, and not shareholders, exert the greatest influence over corporate dividend policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Dividend policy, creditor rights, shareholder rights, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G15, G35

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

O’Connor, Thomas and Byrne, Julie, Shareholder and Creditor Legal Rights and the Outcome Model of Dividends (January 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985539 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1985539

Contact Information

Thomas O'Connor (Contact Author)
National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Department of Economics ( email )
County Kildare
Ireland
Julie Byrne
Dublin City University ( email )
Ireland 9
Dublin 9, leinster 9
Ireland
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 654
Downloads: 98
Download Rank: 159,854
References:  43

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.297 seconds